Abstract. Privacy protection may be defined as replacing the original content in an image region with a (less intrusive) content having modified target appearance information to make it less recognizable by applying a privacy protection technique. Indeed, the development of privacy protection techniques also needs to be complemented with an established objective evaluation method to facilitate their assessment and comparison. Generally, existing evaluation methods rely on the use of subjective judgments or assume a specific target type in image data and use target detection and recognition accuracies to assess privacy protection. An annotation-free evaluation method that is neither subjective nor assumes a specific target type is proposed. It assesses two key aspects of privacy protection: "protection" and "utility." Protection is quantified as an appearance similarity, and utility is measured as a structural similarity between original and privacy-protected image regions. We performed an extensive experimentation using six challenging datasets (having 12 video sequences), including a new dataset (having six sequences) that contains visible and thermal imagery. The new dataset is made available online for the community. We demonstrate effectiveness of the proposed method by evaluating six image-based privacy protection techniques and also show comparisons of the proposed method over existing methods.
Introduction
Recently, countries around the world have seen a rapid growth in the use of surveillance applications in public places. 1 According to an estimate, in 2014, there were 245 million operational surveillance cameras in the world (an estimate by information handling services, 2 a global information company). Indeed, this surge in surveillance applications has led to an increasing need for the privacy protection of individuals. 3, 4 Privacy protection refers, in this work, to replacing the original content of an image (or a region thereof) with a new content having modified appearance information of target(s) so as to make it (them) less recognizable. The new content may be a result of (i) transforming the original content, (ii) perturbing the original content, or (iii) using a different image capturing modality. The first case may involve hiding image regions by applying image processing and filtering operations [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] to provide different levels of privacy protection to targets under consideration. 4 In the second case, perturbations may be added to the original content 13, 14 in the form of displacing the state of the image patch thus obscuring the target's recognition by motion. The third case involves employing a different imaging device that is assumed to be privacy protecting per se. In this work, we use a thermal-infrared (TIR) camera that has been considered privacy preserving for years 15, 16 due to low resolution, high noise levels, and difficulty for a human to interpret thermal imagery and recognize targets; see Refs. 17 and 18 for details on infrared imaging. It would, therefore, be interesting and desirable to quantitatively evaluate the achieved privacy protection with the thermal modality that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been attempted before. Other approaches also exist that analyze a scene holistically (instead of considering explicit object models) for the sake of protecting individuals' privacy; [19] [20] [21] however, they are out of the scope of this paper.
The development of privacy protection techniques also needs to be complemented by an effective means to evaluate them in order to facilitate their fair comparison. Indeed, the two key aspects to consider for objectively evaluating a privacy protection technique are protection and utility. 7, 22 Here, the term "objective" means nonreliance of an evaluation method on subjective judgments. "Protection" refers to a quantification of the extent of appearance information (that would make a target recognizable) modified in an image region by a privacy protection method. Completely hiding out image regions may, however, not be desirable as there may be a need to preserve structural information for performing a higher-level behavioral analysis in a surveillance application. "Utility" is, therefore, also computed as a quantification of the preservation of structural information in the image region by a privacy protection technique. An ideal privacy protection technique may aim to maximize both protection and utility.
Contributions
In this paper, we present an objective evaluation method for assessing protection and utility aspects of image-based privacy protection techniques. The evaluation method is target independent (i.e., it does not assume presence of a specific target type in image data) and annotation free. Protection is assessed in terms of measuring the appearance similarity between original and privacy-protected image regions. Utility is measured by quantifying the structural similarity between the original and privacy-protected image regions. A preliminary version of this work appeared earlier. 23 Unlike that work, 23 this paper provides an improved method (in terms of the normalization to make the bounds of the protection score well-defined) with more justifications. Moreover, this paper presents an extensive experimentation with a detailed validation and analysis using more privacy protection techniques and a much larger number of challenging sequences (including several new ones) containing visible as well as thermal imagery with varying target types (face, full person body, and vehicle). We make available online 24 the new dataset containing thermal and visual sequences to facilitate community in the evaluation of privacy protection techniques in particular and other tasks (e.g., detection and tracking) in general. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed evaluation method by assessing and comparing six privacy protection techniques in the context of video tracking. We also show comparisons of the proposed method over objective and subjective evaluation approaches.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related work and highlights the innovation of the proposed evaluation method with respect to the existing methods. Section 3 defines the problem, which is followed by a description of the proposed method in Sec. 4. A detailed experimental validation and analysis is presented in Sec. 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Related work
Methods exist in the literature that were aimed at evaluating privacy protection techniques based on the use of the judgments of a set of human subjects, "subjective evaluation," 22, [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] or using objective measures that do not rely on subjective responses, "objective evaluation." [30] [31] [32] Next, we provide a review of the existing subjective evaluation (Sec. 2.1) and objective evaluation methods (Sec. 2.2).
Subjective Evaluation
Zhao and Stasko 29 performed a study that evaluated privacy protection filters by showing the filtered video streams to a set of human subjects. Boyle et al. 27 presented a methodology that involved applying global (full-frame) privacy protection on a set of video sequences and showing them to subjects, and in turn assessing the privacy protection techniques based on the collected subjects' responses using questionnaires. Saini et al. 22 and Korshunov et al. 28 also used a similar subjective methodology except that they applied privacy protection locally (only on sensitive image regions) in video sequences. Some more examples of works that also used subjective criteria for evaluating privacy protection include a study by Babaguchi et al. 25 and a more recent one by Birnstill and Ren. 26 The above evaluation methods rely on subjective judgments thus resulting in an inclusion of a possible bias in the assessment. Moreover, in a subjective evaluation study, the test data under consideration, the choice and number of subjects, and the setting-up of questionnaire(s) may need to be analyzed and backed up by the statistical significance testing. 33 
Objective Evaluation
An evaluation framework was proposed that did not rely on subjective judgment and used the face detection and face recognition accuracies on the privacy-protected data as measures of privacy protection. 30, 34 Saini et al. 31 computed privacy loss using a model that incorporated the face detection and face recognition measures in addition to the scene contextual knowledge and some implicit identity inference information. In another work, 32 privacy loss was modeled using only the scene contextual knowledge and implicit identity inference information. While interesting contributions, the above works are target dependent as they assume presence of a specific target type ("face") in the image data and rely also on the performance of detection and recognition algorithms used. Table 1 provides a summary of the existing privacy protection evaluation methods. Unlike existing methods, 22, [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] the proposed method in this paper does not rely on subjective judgments. Additionally, unlike the methods, [30] [31] [32] 34 the proposed method is target independent as it does not require application of privacy protection methods on image data with a particular target type. Moreover, the proposed method does not require target detection and recognition accuracies in the evaluation procedure as in existing methods [30] [31] [32] 34 and is therefore annotation free. Furthermore, while evaluation criteria exist for assessing methods in other computer vision areas, including optical flow estimation, 35 stereo correspondence estimation, 36 and video tracking, 37, 38 there is an absence of an established method for the evaluation of different aspects of privacy protection methods. An initiative was made in the form of a challenge for assessing privacy protection techniques under the MediaEval workshops that, however, used an evaluation that mainly relied on subjective judgments. 39 3 Problem Definition Consider a video sequence V consisting of K frames E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 1 ; 3 2 6 ; 1 5 0
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where f k denotes the frame k. Let X be a set of trajectories (or tracks) estimated by a tracker in V E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 2 ; 3 2 6 ; 9 0 X ¼ fX j g J j¼1 ; where J is the total number of estimated trajectories. X j is the estimated trajectory for target j E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 3 ; 6 3 ;
where k j start and k j end are the first and final frame numbers of X j , respectively E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 4 ; 6 3 ; 6 6 8 X k;j ¼ ðx k;j ; y k;j ; A k;j ; l j Þ;
where ðx k;j ; y k;j Þ and A k;j denote the position and the occupied area information of target j on the image plane, respectively, and l j defines its identity. Here, A k;j is considered in the form of a bounding box, in which case X k;j can be rewritten as E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 5 ; 6 3 ; 5 8 1 X k;j ¼ ðx k;j ; y k;j ; w k;j ; h k;j ; l j Þ;
where w k;j and h k;j denote width and height of the bounding box for target j at f k , respectively. The number of estimated targets at f k is denoted as n k , which is defined as fX k;1 ; : : : ; X k;j ; : : : ; X k;n k g. Let B k;j denote the image region within the bounding box X k;j containing the recognizable appearance information for target j. B k is the set of image regions within all the bounding boxes in f k E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 6 ; 6 3 ; 4 7 2 B k ¼ fB k;1 ; : : : ; B k;j ; : : : ; B k;n k g:
Note that in this work, we consider the tracking problem to be already reliably solved.
Let B 0 k;j denote the privacy-protected image region obtained by applying a privacy protection technique to hide or obscure the target recognizable appearance information in B k;j . Therefore, B 0 k is the set containing the privacyprotected image regions within all the bounding boxes in f k E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 7 ; 6 3 ; 3 6 3 B 0 k ¼ fB 0 k;1 ; : : : ; B 0 k;j ; : : : ; B 0 k;n k g:
The evaluation procedure compares B 0 k with respect to B k , the original unprotected region that acts as a reference, to assess the candidate privacy protection technique in the form of a score, S k , at f k without the need of any annotated ground-truth information.
Evaluation Method for Privacy Protection
Given B k and B 0 k , the proposed evaluation method is aimed to assess the two key aspects of privacy protection: protection and utility (Fig. 1) . Next, we describe the computation of the protection both at frame level (P k ) and sequence level (P) in Sec. 4.1, followed by a description of the quantification of the utility both at frame level (U k ) and sequence level (U) in Sec. 4.2 for a privacy protection technique. Section 4.3 highlights the advantages of the proposed method as compared to an existing method.
Protection
Protection is assessed in terms of the appearance similarity between B k and B 0 k . A smaller appearance similarity between B k and B 0 k alludes to a greater impact of the applied privacy protection. Some well-known similarity measures include Bhattacharyya distance, Kullback-Leibler divergence, Mahalanobis distance, chi-squared similarity, and Earth Mover's distance. We use the Bhattacharyya distance as it has the following advantages: it is a metric unlike the Kullback-Leibler divergence that is nonsymmetric and hence not a metric; unlike the Mahalanobis distance it does not assume the same variance for B k;j and B 0 k;j ; it avoids the singularity problems of chi-squared similarity; 40 compared to the Earth Mover's distance, 41 it is computationally more efficient. 42 Indeed, Bhattacharyya distance has been very widely used in the community for decades. [42] [43] [44] At frame k, we, therefore, compute the amount of achieved protection, P k , in B 0 k as follows:
E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 8 ; 3 2 6 ; 4 6 4
where Dðq B k;j ; q B 0 k;j Þ is the Bhattacharyya distance that provides a similarity at a frame k between the probability density functions (PDFs) of B k;j , q B k;j and B 0 k;j , q B 0 k;j E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 9 ; 3 2 6 ; 3 8 1
which is also termed as Hellinger distance. A PDF is computed as a normalized histogram that is calculated by counting the occurrences of each intensity level (bin) divided by the sum of the counts of all bins. In Eq. (9), BCðq B k;j ; q B 0 k;j Þ is the Bhattacharyya coefficient and is given as follows: 45 E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 0 ; 3 2 6 ; 2 7 5 BCðq
Z ¼ 255 as we use 256 bins (which is equal to the number of intensity levels) in computing the normalized histograms for B k;j and B 0 k;j . In the case of a RGB image E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 1 ; 3 2 6 ; 1 9 2 (11), hence the need for normalization by ffiffi ffi 3 p in Eq. (11) .
Note that for the case of grayscale data, Dð·Þ can simply be computed using Eq. (9) that is anyway numerically bounded, i.e., Dð·Þ ∈ ½0;1. Therefore, P k ∈ ½0;1, the higher P k the greater the amount of achieved protection.
While the computation of P k enables analyzing the achieved protection at each frame, to facilitate the performance comparison between different privacy protection methods, we provide the following two statistics to compute the overall achieved protection, P, across a sequence in the form of a single score E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 2 ; 6 3 ; 4 6 1 P ¼
or E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 3 ; 6 3 ; 4 0 0 P ¼ min fP k g K k¼1 :
Equation (12) provides P by computing "mean" of P k across the frames of a sequence, which might be biased toward outliers, if any. Equation (13) presents an alternative solution that provides P as the "minimum" protection across all the frames of a sequence. We will experimentally analyze the effect of these two statistics on the outcome of evaluation in Sec. 4.3.
Utility
Utility is quantified in terms of the structural similarity between B k and B 0 k . A smaller structural similarity refers to a lower preservation of structural information. For computing the structural similarity, we use the wellknown structural similarity index (SSIM), 46 which was employed in earlier related works.
7,47-49 SSIM has advantages of being a general-purpose measure and offers an assessment that was shown to be perceptually closer to the human visual system. 46 It provides a similarity assessment between B k;j and B 0 k;j by encapsulating their structural comparison (local intensity patterns of pixels) together also with luminance and contrast comparisons. Unlike the existing works, 7,47-49 the proposed SSIM-based formulation quantifies utility for local (region based) privacy protection across a sequence that is directly applicable to (single target as well as multitarget) tracking applications.
At frame k, the utility, U k , is therefore computed as follows:
E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 4 ; 3 2 6 ; 7 5 2
where MSSIMðB k;j ; B 0 k;j Þ is the mean SSIM value between B k;j and B 0 k;j for a variation of local windows 46 E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 5 ; 3 2 6 ; 6 8 9
where SSIM m ðB k;j ; B 0 k;j Þ is the SSIM value for m'th window and is given as follows: 46 E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 6 ; 3 2 6 ; 6 2 0
SSIM is computed on grayscale data 46 is the correlation coefficient; and C 1 and C 2 are constants. U k ∈ ½0;1, the higher U k the larger the utility retained. As done for the case of P (Sec. 4.1), we provide the following two statistics to compute the overall retained utility, U, in the form of a single score E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 7 ; 3 2 6 ; 4 5 2
or E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 8 ; 3 2 6 ; 3 9 4
We will experimentally analyze the effect of these two statistics on the outcome of evaluation in Sec. 4.3.
Indeed, it boils down to determining an appropriate tradeoff between protection and utility to choose a privacy protection technique for a specific application. A total masking Fig. 2 Trade-off between protection and utility. Completely masking out the object information in an image would provide a maximum protection but at the expense of a zero utility. Likewise, leaving the object information unaffected would provide a maximum utility but at the expense of a total loss of protection. out of object information in an image could result in the achievement of a large protection score but at the expense of a total loss of utility. Similarly, leaving the image region unaffected could result in obtaining a maximum utility but at the expense of zero achieved protection (Fig. 2) . Ideally, a privacy protection technique would be expected to maximize both protection and utility. Figure 3 provides numerical examples of the computed protection and utility scores for different privacy protection techniques on sample tracked object patches, which is further discussed in Sec. 5. 
Advantages and Comparisons
We show advantages and comparisons of the proposed evaluation method with an existing objective evaluation method (which is widely used, including the MediaEval workshops) 7, 30, 34, 50 that employs face recognition accuracy as a measure of protection and face detection accuracy as a measure of utility, as well as with respect to a web-based subjective assessment approach. In this regard, we use the well-known PEViD dataset 51 as it provides face annotations that are needed for computing face detection and recognition accuracies. The PEViD dataset has a total of 21 video sequences each containing 400 frames.
We first plot in Fig. 4 the average protection (P) and average utility (U) scores in all the PEViD sequences using the proposed method separately based on mean statistics [Eqs. (12) and (17)] as well as minimum statistics [Eqs. (13) and (18) 4(d) ] are the same in terms of the trends of rankings of privacy protection techniques both with protection (P) and utility (U) scores. Additionally, unlike the minimum statistics that use only the minimum protection/utility value to provide an estimate, the mean statistics could provide a more representative estimate by incorporating contributions from the protection/utility values of all the frames in a sequence. Moreover, the potential bias toward outliers in mean statistics is expected to be minimized because filter strength is kept constant across all the frames of a sequence. Furthermore, mean statistics is often employed in literature for computing the overall protection/ utility across a sequence. 7, 30, [47] [48] [49] We therefore employ mean statistics [Eqs. (12) and (17)] for quantifying the overall protection (P) and utility (U) scores in the rest of this paper.
We now compare and show advantages of the proposed P and U scores [Figs. 4(a) and 4(b) ] with the reported average face recognition and average detection accuracies on blurring, pixelating, and cartooning for a variation of filter intensity in the existing work 7 on the PEViD dataset. Erdelyi et al. 7 used principal component analysis-, linear discriminant analysis-, and local binary patterns-based face recognition methods and a Viola-Jones face detection method. The following observations and points could, therefore, be highlighted here. First, the average P scores obtained using the proposed method show that pixelating is consistently the best followed by blurring and cartooning [ Fig. 4(a) ], which is interestingly similar to the trends of the results of average face recognition accuracies reported in Ref. 7 (the higher the face recognition accuracy, the lower the protection). Likewise, the average U scores obtained using the proposed method show cartooning to be the best followed by blurring and pixelating [ Fig. 4(b) ], which are also in line with the trends of the results of average face detection accuracy reported in Ref. 7 (the higher the face detection accuracy, the higher the utility). Therefore, the results show a strong correlation between the rankings obtained using the proposed P/ U scores and the rankings obtained using face recognition/ face detection accuracies with the computed "Spearman's rank correlation coefficient = 1." Second, the proposed method has an advantage that it does not require any annotation for the computation of protection and utility scores as compared to the evaluation based on face detection and recognition accuracies that rely on annotation. Third, another advantage of the proposed method is that it is target independent and could be applied irrespective of the target type present in the image. Indeed, in Secs. 5.3 and 5.4 that describe the detailed experimental results and analysis, we show the results of evaluation of privacy protection techniques using the proposed method with varying target types (face, full body, and vehicle). The evaluation based on face detection and recognition accuracies has a limitation that it could obviously be used with the face targets only. For other target types, one would need to use the dedicated detection and recognition methods. Last, unlike the evaluation based on face detection and recognition accuracies that depends on the performance of the detection and recognition methods used, the proposed evaluation method does not have any such constraints.
For an enhanced validation of the proposed method, we also adopted a subjective approach that involves an assessment of privacy protection techniques based on the judgments of humans. In the subjective assessment, we use all of the 21 sequences of the PEViD dataset with the abovementioned privacy protection techniques (blurring, pixelating, and cartooning). The assessment has been conducted using a website that, before the start of assessment, provides a uniform set of written instructions to a participating human subject. We use a representative sample of 11 human subjects, including people who are "skilled," "semiskilled," and "unskilled" in privacy protection in videos. The written instructions then follow showing 21 video clips, one by one, to subjects. Each clip contains four subvideos (all played simultaneously) that are embedded in the top-left, topright, bottom-left, and bottom-right quadrants of the video screen. The top-left video contains the original video data of a sequence, whereas the other three videos contain the corresponding processed results generated by applying three privacy protection techniques (blurring, pixelating, and cartooning) with uniform filter strengths (Fig. 5) . As per International Telecommunication Union recommendation, we choose a gray color (red ¼ green ¼ blue ¼ 130) for the background that gives a relaxing effect to human eyes. 52 For each clip, the subjects are asked to perform assessment by rating the three processed videos based on the level of achieved privacy protection by assigning a score between 0 to 5 into a questionnaire form: "0" corresponds to no (zero) privacy protection achieved and "5" corresponds to the maximum privacy protection achieved. The subjects can watch each clip multiple times, if needed, to reach a decision. The results show that, across all of the clips, pixelating is consistently ranked the best in terms of privacy protection followed by blurring and cartooning (Fig. 6 ), which is of course similar to the rankings obtained using the proposed method for these techniques [ Fig. 4(a) ], thus showing a strong correlation between the results of two approaches: "Spearman's rank correlation coefficient ¼ 1."
Experimental Results and Analysis
This section provides in detail the experimental results and analysis. We first describe the datasets (Sec. 5.1) and the privacy protection techniques (Sec. 5.2) used in the experimentation. The results are described in Secs. 5.3 and 5.4, which are followed by a discussion in Sec. 5.5. 
Datasets
We use 12 sequences belonging to six challenging datasets in experiments (Table 2) . Among the datasets, we introduce a new dataset, called TST-Priv, whereas the remaining are existing datasets. TST-Priv contains six sequences (TST-Priv-F1, TST-Priv-F2, TST-Priv-P1, TST-Priv-P2, TST-Priv-V1, and TST-Priv-V2). The dataset provides synchronized visual as well as thermal sequences recorded simultaneously from a visual camera (Canon PowerShot G16) and a thermal camera (FLIR SC655). The choice of cameras is made so as to provide (what is currently regarded as) a high resolution in their respective domains (1080 × 1920 and 480 × 640, respectively). In the setup, both cameras are mounted very close to each other with a very small disparity in their corresponding images. Additionally, the relative position and orientation of both cameras are the same for all recordings. TST-Priv is made publicly available online for the community. 6 The results of the subjective assessment of privacy protection techniques (blurring, pixelating, and cartooning) in terms of the mean of the ratings of all subjects on each clip. Among the existing datasets, four are well-known and publicly available, including ETH, 53 iLids Easy, 54 PETS 2015, 55 and PETS 2000. 56 The fifth one (P5-UK) is recorded in a UK site under the EU project P5. 57 We use two sequences from ETH dataset (ETH Bahnhof and ETH Sunnyday) and a sequence each from iLids Easy, PETS 2015, P5-UK, and PETS 2000 datasets.
The datasets contain "full person bodies, faces, and vehicles" as target types. TST-Priv sequences contain both a single target (TST-Priv-V1) as well as multiple targets (TST-Priv-F1, TST-Priv-F2, TST-Priv-P1, TST-Priv-P2, and TST-Priv-V2). Tracking results on these sequences are generated using a single-target tracker 58 on visual imagery. In the case of multiple targets, the tracker is run separately for each target to obtain its track. To obtain the corresponding tracks on thermal imagery for each scenario, a homography between the corresponding visual and thermal views is estimated. We employ a well-known method that uses (six) point matches in a plane to compute homography. 59 The computed homography is used to map the corner points of the bounding boxes from visual to thermal domain. Note that the estimated tracks on thermal imagery could contain some discrepancies (data offsets) due to possible inaccuracies in the homography computation (see sample TIR patches in Fig. 3 ). ETH Bahnhof, ETH Sunnyday, and iLids Easy contain multiple targets and we use tracking results from a multitarget tracker 60 in these scenes. PETS 2015, P5-UK, and PETS 2000 contain a single target and we use tracking results from a single-target tracker 61 in these scenes. Note that this work does not focus on the choice of tracker per se and is aimed at evaluating different privacy protection techniques on the tracked bounding boxes (of targets) that, in principle, could be generated from any tracker (that uses the same target model).
Privacy Protection Techniques
We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed evaluation method by evaluating and comparing six image-based privacy protection techniques, including cartooning, blurring, pixelating, blanking, motion perturbation (MP), and TIR imaging. Cartooning involves applying an initial blurring on the input image region followed by mean-shift filtering and edge recovery using the already generated gradient mask with Sobel edge detector. 7 The kernel size at the initial blurring stage (A) and the spatial radius (sp) and color radius (sr) at the mean-shift filtering stage are given as follows:
, and sr i ¼ ½i · sr orig ∕50, where i is the filter intensity, i ∈ ½1;100, and the parameters A orig ¼ 7, sp orig ¼ 20, and sr orig ¼ 40.
7 Additionally, as done in Ref. 7 , for establishing some correspondence and a fair comparison, the kernel size used in the case of blurring and pixelating for a particular filter intensity, i, is equal to sp i as defined above for cartooning. We, therefore, apply cartooning, blurring, and pixelating on the tracking results in all datasets for a full variation of filter intensity, i. Blanking completely masks out the privacysensitive information in an image region. MP involves perturbing the motion state of a patch (B k;j ) thus obscuring the identification of an object by motion. For a given B k;j , a perturbation is added to its position ðx k;j ; y k;j Þ by displacing xand y-coordinates. The amount of perturbation is randomly chosen while ensuring that there still remains a reasonable amount of overlap (set to be at least 50% 62 ) between B k;j and the perturbed patch (B 0 k;j ). TIR, of course, achieves privacy protection through the use of thermal imagery and is included in the comparison only in the TST-Priv dataset because thermal imagery is available only for this dataset. Blanking, MP, and TIR obviously remain unaffected over a variation of i.
Therefore, in TST-Priv, we provide the results of the comparison of cartooning, blurring, pixelating, blanking, MP, and TIR using the proposed evaluation method (Sec. 5.3). Note that to compute a privacy score for TIR bounding boxes (that are used in 8-bit form), the corresponding RGB bounding boxes are converted into grayscale (8-bit) format. For the remaining datasets, we provide the results of the comparison of cartooning, blurring, pixelating, blanking, and MP using the proposed method (Sec. 5.4).
Results in TST-Priv Dataset
Figures 7 and 8 plot the protection (P) and utility (U) scores, respectively, of the six privacy protection techniques (blanking, blurring, pixelating, cartooning, MP, and TIR) for a variation of i in all TST-Priv sequences. Figure 3 shows sample qualitative results for these techniques with an increasing i.
Expectedly, in all sequences, blanking provides the highest P [Figs. 7(a)-7(f)] as it masks out the entire information in the image data (Fig. 3) . Among TIR, cartooning, blurring, and MP, TIR consistently obtains the highest P in all sequences for the entire variation of i as shown in Figs. 7(a)-7(f) . Between TIR and pixelating, the former obtains a higher P in TST-Priv-F2 [ Fig. 7(b) ]. On the remaining sequences, TIR does not achieve a higher P than pixelating for an entire variation of i; indeed, the former outperforms the latter in TST-Priv-F1 for i ≤ 66 [ Fig. 7(a) ], in TST-Priv-P1 for i ≤ 81 [ Fig. 7(c) ], in TST-Priv-P2 for i ≤ 26 [ Fig. 7(d) ], in TST-Priv-V1 for i ≤ 78 [ Fig. 7(e) ], and in TST-Priv-V2 for i ≤ 61 [ Fig. 7(f) ]. Among pixelating, blurring, and cartooning, pixelating is consistently the best in terms of P followed by blurring and cartooning over a variation of i. Note that for i ∈ ½1;3, P ¼ 0 for blurring and pixelating because according to the equation of sp i , their kernel size is 1 × 1 thus leaving the image regions unaltered by these two techniques. Finally, MP is generally found to achieve the lowest P for most of the variation of i [Figs. 7(a)-7(f) ], which is in line with the conclusions of an earlier study 63 that data perturbation may not always be an effective means for protecting privacy.
The utility scores (U) obtained by six techniques over a variation of i across all TST-Priv sequences are plotted in Figs. 8(a)-8(f) . Cartooning preserves the structural information better than all methods (Fig. 3) . Indeed, in all sequences, cartooning shows the best U for the entire variation of i with blurring and pixelating obtaining the second-best and thirdbest U. The fourth-best U is either by MP (in TST-Priv-F1, TST-Priv-F2, and TST-Priv-P2) or TIR (in TST-Priv-P1, TST-Priv-V1, and TST-Priv-V2). Blanking, which consistently achieves the highest protection (P), provides the least utility (smallest U) in all sequences due to a total loss of structural information.
Indeed, the aim for a privacy protection technique would be to provide an appropriate trade-off between U and P. To this end, in Fig. 9 , we also plot U (as computed in Fig. 8 ) versus P (as computed in Fig. 7 . After blanking, pixelating consistently obtains the highest P followed by blurring and cartooning in all sequences for the entire variation of i. MP has, generally, shown the lowest P among all techniques for most of the variation of i in all sequences. Moreover, the trends of the utility scores (U) obtained by the five methods over a variation of i are alike across all sequences [ Figs. 11(a)-11(f) ]. The highest U is obtained by cartooning followed by blurring, pixelating, MP, and blanking, which also corresponds to the results obtained in TST-Priv sequences (Sec. 5.3).
Results on Existing Datasets
As done in the case of TST-Priv sequences, we also plot U versus P for ETH Bahnhof, ETH Sunnyday, iLids Easy, PETS 2015, P5-UK, and PETS 2000 [ Figs. 12(a)-12(f) ]. In general, pixelating is found to provide a better tradeoff between U and P on datasets with full body target [ Figs. 12(a)-12(c)] , and cartooning provides a better trade-off on datasets with vehicle target [Figs. 12(d)-12(f) ].
Discussion
We checked the statistical significance of the P and U scores obtained by the privacy protection techniques on each of the 12 sequences using the Welch ANOVA test. 64 Statistical significance is achieved at the standard 5% significance level both for the case of P and U scores on each sequence. Figure 13 provides the overall performance of privacy protection techniques computed in the form of mean P (P μ ) and mean U (U μ ) over the entire variation of filter intensity (i) in all TST-Priv sequences. Blanking expectedly achieves the highest P μ in all sequences. Among the remaining techniques, TIR shows the best P μ on every sequence except in TST-Priv-P2 where pixelating is the best. However, based on visual judgment, TIR data seem to possess features (see Fig. 3 , TIR column) that might enable target recognition thus alluding that it might not be as privacy protecting as reflected by its high protection scores. Additionally, cartooning is the best in terms of U μ in all sequences. Moreover, we also computed the cumulative protection and utility scores that are the average scores over all sequences (Fig. 13) . The results show that (except blanking) TIR has the best cumulative protection score, and cartooning has the best cumulative utility score.
Similarly, Fig. 14 lists the mean P (P μ ) and mean U (U μ ) over the variation of i on ETH Bahnhof, ETH Sunnyday, iLids Easy, PETS 2015, P5-UK, and PETS 2000. Except blanking that again has the best P μ , pixelating outperforms blurring, cartooning, and MP in terms of P μ in all sequences. 13 Overall performance of privacy protection techniques in terms of mean P (P μ ) and mean U (U μ ) over a variation of filter intensity (i) in all TST-Priv sequences. Note that blanking, MP, and TIR of course remain unaffected over a variation of i. Cumulative (Cum.) protection and utility scores are also listed that are the average scores over all sequences. On each sequence the best two techniques with the highest P μ are highlighted in yellow and the best two techniques with the highest U μ are highlighted in gray; the darker the color the better the performance.
Fig. 14 Overall performance of privacy protection techniques in terms of mean P (P μ ) and mean U (U μ ) over a variation of filter intensity (i) on ETH Bahnhof, ETH Sunnyday, iLids Easy, PETS 2015, P5-UK, and PETS 2000. Note that blanking and MP of course remain unaffected over a variation of i. Cumulative (Cum.) protection and utility scores are also listed that are the average scores over all sequences. On each sequence the best two techniques with the highest P μ are highlighted in yellow and the best two techniques with the highest U μ are highlighted in gray; the darker the color the better the performance.
Journal of Electronic Imaging 051408-13 Sep∕Oct 2017 • Vol. 26 (5) As in the case of TST-Priv sequences, cartooning again shows the best U μ in all sequences. In terms of cumulative protection score, blanking and pixelating are the best, and in terms of cumulative utility score, cartooning and blurring are the best (Fig. 14) .
Conclusions
This paper presented an annotation-free and target-independent objective evaluation method for image-based privacy protection techniques. The proposed method evaluates protection by quantifying the Bhattacharyya distance-based appearance similarity and utility by measuring the SSIMbased structural similarity between the original and the privacy-protected image regions. We showed the effectiveness and advantages of the proposed method using the PEViD dataset containing visible imagery over an existing objective evaluation method, which is widely used and employs the face recognition accuracy as a measure of protection and the face detection accuracy as a measure of utility. We highlighted that the proposed method interestingly offered similar results (in terms of ranking of different privacy protection techniques) to those of that existing method, thus showing a strong correlation, Spearman's coefficient ¼ 1. We underlined the advantages of the proposed method of being annotation free and target independent over that existing method. Moreover, using the PEViD dataset, we also adopted a webbased subjective assessment approach to further validate the effectiveness of the proposed method. Again, in this case, a strong correlation (Spearman's coefficient ¼ 1) has been reported between the rankings of privacy protection techniques obtained using the proposed method and those obtained based on the judgments of a set of human subjects that include people who are skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled in privacy protection in videos. We also conducted an extensive experimentation on six challenging datasets (including a new one) containing 12 sequences with face, full person body, and vehicle as target types. The new dataset, called TST-Priv, contains six sequences with both visible and thermal imagery and is made available online for the community. We demonstrated a statistically significant comparison of a diverse set of six privacy protection techniques using the proposed evaluation method. While some techniques (blurring, pixelating, and cartooning) involve the use of filter intensity to provide varying protection strengths, others (blanking, MP, and TIR imaging) do not rely on the use of filter intensity. Blanking is expectedly the best in terms of protection score. It, however, causes a total loss of the information, which is likely to be not desirable in general. Among the remaining techniques, TIR or pixelating showed the highest protection score. It is, however, important to highlight that TIR visually seems not to preserve the privacy well because of an apparent presence of recognizable target features in the imagery (see Fig. 3 , TIR column), which of course does not correspond to the conclusions drawn based on its quantitative evaluation using the proposed method. Therefore, a need remains to subjectively assess the proposed evaluation method for the case of TIR imagery as well. On the other hand, in terms of utility score, cartooning is consistently the best, and blurring is the second best. Although TIR visually seems to preserve the structural information well, it has obtained a lower utility than expected in the experiments. This is likely to be due to the offset caused in the estimated bounding box patches on the thermal imagery as a result of possible inaccuracies in the homography computation. Finally, in terms of providing an appropriate trade-off between protection and utility, cartooning and pixelating are generally found to be desirable.
The proposed evaluation method also has some limitations. First, there exist works that are aimed at identification of persons by analyzing body structure (e.g., anthropometric biometrics) 65, 66 and gait. 67, 68 Often these approaches rely on "temporal" measurements by analyzing recorded imagery over a period of time. In such a case, the problem of privacy protection and its evaluation becomes different and is expected to account for temporal information of targets. Our work instead focuses on image-based measurements, and the above-mentioned temporal aspects are out of scope and hence not considered. Second, the proposed evaluation method may not provide completely plausible results for a privacy protection that involves showing only the target contours. In such a case, the proposed evaluation method is expected to give a higher (plausible) protection score but a lower (nonplausible) utility score. Third, the use of the proposed evaluation method (and, potentially, some of the existing related methods) is limited mainly to the visible imaging modality, and their application to other imaging modalities (e.g., TIR) needs to be further experimentally analyzed and validated based on, for example, the subjective assessment. Future work could focus on addressing the above limitations. Moreover, in this work, while the usefulness of the proposed evaluation method is shown in the context of video tracking by applying privacy protection techniques locally on estimated (target) image regions by trackers, the method is actually not constrained by tracking. In fact, the proposed method is generic and could be employed for evaluating privacy protection techniques whether applied on image regions generated by a tracker or otherwise, or even on full frames.
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